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One reservation about this fine piece.

The genocide charge is tougher to prove as a legal matter than is perhaps generally understood.

You write: “The Convention’s text supports the verdict of these scholars and organizations” that believe Israel is guilty of genocide.

But there’s a wrinkle: as with everything legal, there’s case law, rarely cited in popular accounts.

The intent and evidence standards to win a guilty verdict for genocide are very high.

The ICJ must be “"fully convinced” and the evidence must be “"fully conclusive.” In other words, comparable to beyond a reasonable doubt.

Furthermore, genocide must be “the only reasonable inference … from the acts in question.” (per Bosnia v. Croatia 2015

https://www.icj-cij.org/case/118

That means that a plausible alternative explanation gets you off the hook. In Israel’s case, that would be that it was pursuing the military goal of defeating the enemy. Even if the actions violated proportionality. Unlawful displacement of the population? Sorry, the defense says, that’s a different crime.

Kenneth Roth, former executive director of Human Rights Watch, who believes Israel is committing genocide, seems to concede Israel would prevail in court under the current standard, which is why he wants to change it.

https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/jul/24/israel-genocide-gaza

As far as I can tell, the genocide scholars, like Bartov, pay no attention to this. Only the lawyers.

I’m guessing that Israel’s defenders do not bring up these points because they fear seeming too legalistic - like they’re trying to get off on a technicality. Israel’s opponents steer clear of them because they arguably favor Israel. Or because they see it as legal nitpicking. But genocide is legal concept, so aren’t these points relevant?

Here’s a key quote from Roth’s piece - where he argues the ICJ needs “to correct its jurisprudence” - implying otherwise Israel might prevail:

“So the ICJ will likely also examine whether genocidal intent can be inferred from Israel’s conduct in Gaza. That is where the court’s conservative jurisprudence introduces a complication.

In its 2015 decision in Croatia v Serbia, the court ruled that genocidal intent could be inferred from conduct if it “is the only inference that can reasonably be drawn from the acts in question”. Because the killing in that case was also committed with the aim of forced displacement, the court ruled it could not give rise to an inference of genocidal intent.

Ignoring the possibility of two parallel intents – one to commit genocide, another to advance ethnic cleansing – the court’s ruling suggests, anomalously, that the war crime of forced displacement could be a defense to a charge of genocide. That makes no sense. The issue should be whether a charge is conclusively proved, not whether it is the only criminal activity under way.

“The ICJ will have a chance to correct its jurisprudence in the Gambia v Myanmar case about the Myanmar military’s attacks on the Rohingya, which should be decided before the Israel case. The court would be well advised to find that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya for the purpose of ethnically cleansing them – that forced mass deportation was a motive, not a defense, for genocide. That would lay the groundwork for a similar ruling against Israel.”

P.S.

Roth’s is not the only view on the case law. There appears to be quite a debate over “only plausible inference.”

Amnesty International argues for a broad view.

https://opiniojuris.org/2025/05/26/genocidal-intent-in-armed-conflict-unpacking-the-icjs-only-reasonable-inference-standard/

Another scholar, arguing for the narrow view

https://x.com/stefantalmon/status/1864704426255974704?s=61&t=EUEPNorcS2G_uwppF61fMQ

Whatever the interpretation, it’s pretty clear “only plausible inference” is a high bar.

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